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The transition to a market economy in Eastern  response to increasing demand for more trans-
Europe requires eliminating some institutions  parent policy and an institutionalized  voice for
and practices and introducing new agencies with  the public in policymaking.
new goals. staffed by people with different
attitudes and behavior.  After interviewing 42  *  A hospitable busincss environment, which
World Bank experts and other experts in the  means clarification of property rights; policy
donor and academic communities, Rice synthe-  stability, consistency, and accountability; low-
sizes their views on World Bank member  cost provision of govcrnment services and
countries in Central and Eastem Europe (Bul-  infrastructure; and the protection of agents from
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Roma-  abuses in the marketplace.
nia, and Yugoslavia):
C  aaoncem for public welfare and social
* Giving a broad-brush overview of what is  justice, as citizens of post-communist Eastem
known about capacity constraints in key public  Europe hopc to obtain both the familiar basic
institutions involved in the transition.  securitics (job security, subsidized consumption,
and universal access to basic health care and
* Identifying current and proposed actions of  education) as well as new rights and freedoms.
the World Bank and other donors.
* Efficient governmcnt administration at all
* Indicating critical institutional issues on  levels, under the scrutiny of elected legislatures,
which future operational work and rcsearch  citizens groups, and intemal audit and review
might focus.  agencies.
Rice finds that a consensus has cmerged on  Rice identifies five areas in which extemal
fivc principles that cstablish the socially accept-  institutional assistancc is necded:  (1) policy
able domain for govemment economic activity in  advice on a range of issues; (2) more in-depth
Eastcrn Europe:  technical assistancc; (3) a large-scalc training
effort to help close Eastem Europe's  massive
* Retreat from the discredited central govem-  "skills gap" in cconomics and busincss; (4)
ment, as subnational govemrnments  and private  diagnostic research; and (5) the design of broad,
entcrprises assume many functions of central  mcdium-term action plans.  For each of these
governments.  issues, he describes numerous mea ures to be
pursued.
* Improved channels of communication
between governments and their citizens, in
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Eastern European governrents have been preoccupied with the grand questions  of dismantling
inherited socialist political structures and the command economy, rewriting their constitutions  and laws
to facilitate  the emergence of democracy  and markets, and responding to the resulting shocks and crises.
Understandably,  there has been no systematic  evaluation  to date of the capacity  of these governments  to
implement  the transformation.
Many individuals in these reforming economies, and in the World Bank, other multilateral
organizations, bilateral donor countries  and non-governmental  organizations,  have recognized  the acute
need for institutional  reforms in support of the transition to a market economy. And in fact, institutional
reform is rapidly, but so far haphazardly, entering into the dialogues  and operations of Eastern Europe
and these organizations.
The transition to a market economy  clearly requires both the elimination  of a range of existing
institutions  and practices in these countries, and the introduction  of new agencies, with new goals, staffed
with people having different attitudes and behavior.  But there has been little specification  of precisely
what this means: which structures  and procedures  should be modified  and how; what resources - human,
physical, financial - are required to carry out the task.
This paper is a first effort to lay out the problem. It has three general purposes: (1) to determine
what is known about capacity constraints in key public institutions involved in the transition; 1 (2) to
identify current and proposed actions by the World Bank and other donors; and (3) to indicate critical
institutional  issues  that might be the focus of future operational  work and research by the World Bank and
others.
The paper synthesizes views expressed in interviews of 42 relevant Bank staff and selected
experts in the donor and academic communities. These interviews were supplemented  by a review of
World Bank and Eastern European government  documents,  as well as other policy literature. The study
'lne  paper does not focus on stabilization  policy and macro-economic  reform, private sector issues
such as enterprise restructuring (even though it may be undertaken by the government),  or issues  that
involve specific economic  sectors.  It pays little attention  to areas where change is already well
underway (for example, defining property rights), where there has already been extensive  discussion
(such as the privatization  of public enterprises, or the demise of CMEA and liberalization  of
intentional  trade), or where the issues are already reasonably well-understood  (such as banking
systm  reform and housing reforns).  Finally, the paper discusses non-governmental  organizations
(NGOs) only insofar as they figure into potential  solutions for other core problems  discussed in the
paper.
1includes  all World  Bank  member  countries  in Central  and Eastern  Eure,  - Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,
Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  and  Yugoslavia.
A consensus emerges from interviews and available government posiion pieces 2 on a Set of
principles  which  establishes  the socially-acceptable  domain  for government  economic  activity  in Eastern
Europe:
Retreat from the discredited central government  as subnational  govemnents  and private
enterprises  assume  many  functions  of central  governments.
Improved channels  of communication  between  governments  and ther  citizem, as policy
transparency  and a voice for the public  in the policy-making  process  are increasingly  being
demanded  and institutionalized.
Creation of a hospitable  business environment,  including:  claification  of property  rights;
policy  stability,  consistency  and accountability;  low-cost  provision  of government  services  and
infrastructure;  and  protection  of agents  from abuses  in the marketplace.
Concern  for public  welfare and social  justice, as citizens  of post-communist  Easter Europe
are  hoping  to obtain  both  the familiar  basic  securities  (ob security,  subsidized  consumption,  and
universal  access  to basic  health  care and education)  as well  as new  freedoms  and  rights.
Efricient  government  administration  at all levels,  under  the scrutiny  of elected  legislatures,
citizens  groups,  and internal  audit  and  review  agencies.
lhese principles  constitute  politic-' constraints  on the formulation  of a succegs-ul  institutional  reform
strategy  and  so guide  the analysis  of this paper.
For Eastern  European  countries  that  have  made  the greatest  strides  in terms  of economic  policy
reform, many of  those interviewed  underscore  the need to turn rapidly to  neglected  issues of
implementation.  For those  which  are still in the early stages  of constitutional  and legislative  reform,
respondents  emphasize  that certain  institutional  reforms  must be addressed  even in the early stages  of
macroeconomic  stabilization  and adjustment. The exercise  identifies  five critical areas for external
institutional  assistance:  (1) policy  advice  on a range  of issues;  (2) more-in-depth  technical  assistance;  (3)
2Pepurt  of th  Bulgartan  Economic  Trnsition Project,  "Scenario  of the Economic  Reforma
(Czechoslovakia);  Hungerian Economic, Financia and Monetary  Policies: Proposals  for a Coherent
4pproach  and  Hungary  in Tranfosnnadon  to Freedom  and Prosperity  (the  Blue  Ribbon  Commission
report); aMemorandum  of the Government  of Poland  on Economic  Reform  and Medium-Term
Policies,  1991-1993';  Progran  of Working  Out  and Coordinating  Reform  Projects  (Romania);
Prasnikar  and Pregl  (1990),  and  Speech  of Prime  Minisr  Markovic,  December  18, 1989
(Yugoslavia).
2a large-scale  training effort to help close Eastern  Europe's massive 'skills gap' in economics  and business;
(4) diaposdc  research; and (5) the design of broad, medium-erm action plans.
One caveat: the paper is a preliminary,  broad-bmsh study, and does not offer a plan to resolve
Eastern Europe's institutional impediments. Rather, it tries to identify the most importa  instiional
questions  affecting  the prospects  for a successful  transition.  .ne exercise is limited  by the went  to which
it Is possible to generalize across the six reforming countries  of Eastem Europe.  Nonetheless,  decades
of sociist  economic, political and social practice created important similarides  across Eastern Europe,
thereby allowing  scope for meaningful  generalization.
3ISSUES  IN INS9TiTUFONAL  REFORM
(1)  Policr-making  capacity
Many of those interviewed  report that the design and direction of economic  reforms is heavily
taxing the macroeconomic  policy apparats  of every country of Eastern Europe.  Respondents  point to
three ways of enhancing  the level of efficiency  with which these govenments make and implement  policy:
introducing  policy coordination  mechanisms, improving  government access to information,  and offering
techical  training for economic  policy-makers. lbe  first two areas are discussed  below, while the last is
taken up in  Civil Service Reform.'
Respondents  express a general concern that, in each government ministry, ministers and their
senior staff tend to operate in relative isolation  from other ministries. They believe  that very few officials
grasp the broad shape of their national  reform program or can express the underlying  motivations  for the
policies being enacted.'
The executive branches lack a top-level focal point for promulgating,  debating, and approving
specific economic reform measures.  Many respondents therefore argue that govenments need (1) to
develop a strategic vision of the transition and to manage its broad direction, and (2) to enhance policy
coordination  across ministries  to ensure the quality, consistency,  and prioritization  of these measures. Yet
there remains substantial  disagreement  as to how this can best be achieved  in each country. In particular,
many observers worry about two risks of such a transition policy apparatus: that it might become large
and bureaucratized,  or that it might be marginalized  unless it has considerable  stature.
Several countries  are evaluating  alternative  types  of transition policy  apparatus, and each country
will require a structure that fits its particular circumstances.  This may simply consist of formal and
informal  contacts among  economic  ministers  (as in Poland), an inter-ministerial  coordination  council  (such
as the one Romania  proposes  to introduce),  or a temporary  transition office  or ministry, possibly  including
a technical secretariat.'  The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's (CSFR) new hybrid system shares the
'Nonetheless, macroeconomic  reform policy outcomes  have generally  been excellent from the
perspective  of the multilateral institutions.
Tbis technical secretariat could reside under either a transition minister (or coordinator), a council
of economic  ministers, the Council of Ministers, or the Ministry of Finance.
4coordination  function  between  a cabinet-level  inter-ministerial  council  for the economic  wansition,  and  a
financial  council  composed  of the federal  and republican  ministers  of finance  plus the president  of the
central  bank.
'Tose  interviewed  suggest that multilateral  and bilateral advisors can help by advising
govermens about  experiences  outside  the region,  stressing  the importance  of coordination  and  the  impact
of economic  linkages. Especially  in countries  where  there are few expatriate  or interational resident
advisors  - as in Romania  and  Bulgaria  - resident  World  Bank  missions  could  provide  'a few  good  people
on the grund' fer  a4;i  4vi  nL;  - oI1 a:t;iLvesandtheir  trade-offs.
For the medium-term,  it seems  that  all governments  of Eastern  Europe  will  have  to expand  their
capacity  to formulate  economic  projections  and  strtegies. There  now  exist  few govnment mechanisms
for making  multi-year  estimates,  and for laying  out indicative  strategies  for the  public  and  private  sectors.
Respondents  believe  that establishing  formal  economic  projections  and strategies  would  be particulaiy
helpful  for determining  the priorities  and design  of legal,  regulatory,  and  public  finance  reforms,  and of
government  services. Along  these  lines, Bulgaria  has supplanted  its large  planning  ministry  with  a new,
small  agency  for indicative  planning.
Some  suggest  that  the  countries  which  experimented  successfilly  with  mechanisms  for  developing
economic  strategy (e.g. France, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Tbailand)  could offer Eastern Europe
organizational  models  and  technical  assistance.' An integral  part of these  mechanisms  is the forging  of
stable  coalitions  among  representatives  of a fairly  wide  of interests,  including  government,  business  and
labor. This is intended  to ensure  that  government  policy-making  in these  countries  accounts  for the needs
and concerns  of the private sector, and also to enhance  popular  support  for policy.  In this respect,
Hungary's  incipient  National  Reconciliation  Council  may  prove  to be a model  for the region  of such  a
tripartite  advisory  agency.
In many  critical  areas,  governments'  ability  to make  sensible  policy  is also  sorely  hampered  by
a lack  of information.  For example,  across  the region  countries  have  essentially  no data  on goods  prices
outside  the public  sector, or on the changing  condition  of the poor.  They also lack Inowledge  of
economic  policy  alternatives  and  reform  experiences  elsewhere  in the region  and in the  developing  world.
These goverments' need for information  demands  activity  in at least three areas: overhauling  their
statistical  systems,  exploiting  non-goverunental  resources,  and information-sharing  across  the region.
'Of course,  certain  social  differences  between  these  societies  and  those  of Eastern  Europe  will  call
for appropriate  adaptations  of any model.
5The statitcal  sysms  of Eastern Europe were designed to  serve the needs of  a planned
eoonomy, And except in the CSFR, and for some types  of data in Poland and Hungary, the quality of
thes  saics  is judged by respondents  to be poor.  For instance, there are limited  data on the emerging
private secomr.  So as private busines  appeared alongside  state entprises  in Hungary and Polan  last
year, government  data reported massive  declines in (state) Industrial  production  and (state) employment  -
- even though the dip in private consumpdon  appears to be much smaller.
There is broad agreemeut  on the pressing  need for Eastern Eurpe  countries  to develop statistical
systems and new data series to serve the policy needs of business and of their new goveres.  Such
fortu would include the adopdon  of modem international  concepts, methods,  and stadrds  for stadstical
collecton and reportlng.  A number  of curree projects aim at expanding  statistical  capabilities  in Easen
Europe are underway. Substantial  consensus  has been reached concering the specific needs of individual
countries among a loosely-coordinated  donor group, which includes  the IMF, the World Bank, Eurostat
(an agency of the European Community),  the OECD, the UN Economic Commission  for Europe, and
numerous  bilateral agencies. Eurostathas assumed  the lead role in coordinating  and managing  the group's
assessment and tehical  assistance  effort.
Although World Bank staff members indicate  that Poland and Hungary are now relatively  well-
seved  by tehnical  assistance  from many  sources, sufficieit resources have yet to be applied  to statistcal
development  elsewhee.  Limited  activity has begun in Czechoslovakia,  although  its needs are apparenty
less acute than those elsewher,  Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia  have rather extreme  statistical  needs,
which are now begining  to be wessed  through bilatr  assistance. In general, respondents would like
to see each country evenually develop a blueprint of its statistical needs, indicaing the agencies and
materia resources required to meet them.
With regard to extra-governmental  sources  of information,  academic  institutes  of economics  and
finance  - both insid  a and outside  the government  bureaucracy  - already provide  substantial  policy  analysis
in Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, and Poland.  So do some university  culty and independent  groups of
eminent citizens and experts (such as Hungary's Blue Ribbon Commission and Bulgaria's Economic
Tasidon  Project). A similar role may be in store for Walesa's recently  proposed "Council  of Importlnt
'For insace,  the Material Product System (MPS) found in Socialist economies  is being replaced
by the System of National Accounts (SNA) used elsewhere. Because  the former excludes  service
sector actvity, governmens will have to install systems for collecting data relevant to this sector.
And since the govement  will not automatically  receive information  from service sector firms
regarding their activities, it will be obliged to introduce  a system of regular business surveys.
6Persons"  in Poland. Since  governments  are  strapped  for analytical  experise,  they  might  make  greater  use
of such  extra-governmental  resources.
lhe governments  of the CSFR and Hungary have  bftn quite successfu In their concr  efforts
to attract  expatriate  advisors,  some  funded  by external  non-governmental  foundations  or bilateral  assistance
programs.  Some  of those  interviewed  suggest  that  Eastern  European  countries  exj 'nd their  policy  analysis
and implementation  capabilities  by stepping  up efforts  to exploit  the technical  expertise  of expatriate
nationals  (both  as short- and long-  term advisors,  and as senior  civil servants),  using  private  external
financing.
It has also been  recommended  the the governments  of the region  can lear  from each  others'
experiences  by increasing  their information-sharing.  For instance,  Poland's  unforuate experience  with
hyperinflation  taught  the rest ot the region  how  to design  better  anti-inflation  policies,  and the urgency
of doing  so. Not  only  would  information-sharingenable  govemments  to borrow  successful  programs  from
their neighbors,  but it would  help  them  sustain  public  support  for diffiult policies  by showing  that the
policies  worked  elsewhere.
The  governments  of the  CSFR,  Hungary  and  Poland  continually  exchange  views  and  experiences
among  themselves  (on  privatization  programs,  for instance).  Many  of these  contacts  take  place  informally,
while others occur in regional  or international  conferences  or through  the intermediation  of outside
advisors  or agencies. Borrowing  good  ideas  from  other  countries  in the region  offers  the advantage  that
the ideas tend to embody  "appropriate  technology,'  involving  policies  that are likely  to be relatively
inexpensive  and simple  to manage. Foreign  donors  can fhcilitate  this dissemination  of information,  by
virtue  of their cross-country  experience.
(2)  Building  and  strenthen  elected leeislatures
Many  of those  interviewed  worry  that  the elected  legislatures  of Eastern  Europe  lack  the ability
to provide  an institutionalized  check  on the power  of the bureaucracy.  Unlike  legislatures  in Western
Europe  and  the U.S., none  of those  in Eastern  Europe  has an active  committee  structure'  or formal  access
to qualified  outside  expertise. Rather, they are forced to rely on the executive  branch  for data and
analysis,  which limits  their ability  to reach inforned, independent  decisions  on the large volumes  of
pending  legislation  they  face.
7Hungary  and Poland  now  have  nascent  Parliamentary  committee  structures.
7For the present, it seems  that parliamenaians will have to rely to some  extent  on academic
istitutes - as they  currently  do in Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  Poland  - to substitute  for their  lack  of
research  and analytical  capacity. In addition,  some  individual  OECD  countries  and other  organizations
have  begun  to offer technical  assistance,  including  proposal by parliamentary  research  groups  in OECD
countries  to set up similar  groups  in Eastern  Europe. (Respondents  do not believe  that this is an area in
which  the World  Bank  has either  a mandate  or experience).
The most direct involvement  with parliaments  comes  from the European  Community,  whose
assistance  includes  political  cond'ionality.  The desire of Eastern European  countries  for eventual
affiliation  with the European  Community  gives  them extra encouragement  to continue  developing  their
democratic  institutions.  However,  external  advice  and  technical  assistance  will not  provide  a  quick  fix'
for what  is expected  to be a difF.cult  and long-term  development  problem.
Similarly,  the OECD is undertaking  a  'policy dialogue' (the OECD's name for technical
assistance  in public  management)  with  some  countries  of Eastern  Europe,  which  includes  some  areas  of
parliamentary  strengthening.  In particular,  the OECD  has a long  history  of such  dialogue  with  Yugoslavia
by virtue  of the latter's associate  stats.  This might  also  become  an area  of activity  for bilateral  donors,
some of whom  have assisted  in strengthening  parliamentary  institutions  elsewhere  in the world.  The
development  of democratic  institutions  is also served  by existing  parliamentary  exchanges  with  Western
Europe  and the U.S., and by technical  assistance  from independent  public  interest  organizations.
(3)  Maintaining  olitical support  for the transition
It is widely  believed  that, even  under  the best conditions,  the reforms  now being  initiated  in
Eastern  Europe  will  take  years  to come  to fruition. Yet  the more  governments  are able  to build  and  retain
popular  support  for their policies,  the less will be the costs and risks of the reform  process. In this
regard,  respondents  iusist  that  governments  must  pay  particular  attention  to two  sensitive  areas:  their  frail
legitimacy  and what has come to be called an  expectations  gap."
Eastern Europe's govermments  face a  substantial  challenge  to  change the perception  of
government  from  that of an agent  that  cheats  its citizens  to one  which  responds  to its citizens'  demands.
Some respondents  worry that newly-won  government  legitimacy  might be  eroded by  perceived
arbitrariness,  corruption,  or patronage.
There seems  to be a consensus  that  clear and  simple  rules, impartially  enforced,  will go a lorng
way  toward  strengthening  government  legitimacy.  For this  reason  (as well  as for the sake  of efficien:.y),
simplicity  be an important  litmus  test of good  policy  design.
8It appears that legitimacy  will also require that administrators  earn the public trust, something
which will be  difficult for  governments seen to  include large numbers of  communists or  former
communists. To this end, citizens are demanding  policy transparency, a right which governments  are
beginning  to guarantee  legally. For instance, Romania's reform program mandates  that the 'budget shall
be made public during its making, approval and execution  stages."  As legislatures, business, and other
outside entities expand their capacity to digest such information,  this demand is likely to become more
important  and more institutionalized. Several respondents  felt that freedom of speech and the press, as
well as political pluralism, will exert pressure on governments  to eliminate  remaining  restrictions.
Legitimacy will also require that governnments  overcome the risk of pervasive corruption.
Respondeints  find this  especially worrisome at the local level,  where control is weaker and most
government services  are actally  delivered. Stories of corruption  have already splashed across headlines
in Eastern Europe.  As the region's free press develops, it should help make corruption more difficult  to
perpetrate.  Some suggest that support should be made available for some form of technical assistance  to
nreempt and fight corruption.  Possible  measures  might include a national  diagnostic  study of the nature
and causes of the corruption  problem in a country; the upgrading  of government  accounting, disclosure
and auditing requirements for certain government functions;' the introduction  of legal limitations on
political patronage and of conflict-of-interest  rules; contrcting-out of some government services; and
efforts at public education  in civic values.
Governments  elsewhere  have  two other important  mechanisms  for denouncing  corruption, abuse
and mismanagement  by their agents:  various kinds  of "whistle-blowing"  mechanisms  and intemal auditing.
Neither has yet garnered much attention  in the refonns of Eastern Europe. The former is considered  an
area of secondary  importance, although  some countries  are giving  thought  to the eventual  introduction  of
a citizens' advocate (as has existed in Poland since 1988).  However, internal government auditing is
recognized  as being  of prime importance,  and is discussed  fiurher in the section "Public  Finance Reform.  "
Many also feel that government  legitimacy  would be enhanced  by expanding participation  in
policy-making.  Several countries  - including France, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan - have successfully
given interest groups a voice in government  policy. Their experiences  show how to mitigate  the political
risks and economic costs of reform by making business, labor, and other groupse 'owners'  of the
'OECD countries might provide support in building such institutions,  given that they all have some
form of internal financial reporting requirements  and sef-auditing.
gin Eastern Euope,  such participation  might also include representatives  of regional and local
govemments  and state enterprises.
9policies, who .nd  to benefit from them. This may be particularly  critical in Easten Europe. The degree
of formality of such arrangements  would depend on the individual  country, ranging from membership  in
govermnent councils, to regularized public hearings, debate and referenda, to casual consultations  on
individual  pieces of legislation.
Other respondents  stress the opening  of channels  for grassroots  empowennent  and 'voice  vis-a-
vis the government. For example, many foreign  legal systems  offer private citizens  recourse  to challenge
the legality of government policy via such mechanisms  as class action suits and grand juries.  Another
approach  has been the creation of citizens  panels to monitor the functions  of certain  government  agencies.
In addition, introducing a liberal legal environment  for private expression, including  that of the press, is
a further means of enabling non-government  interests  to communicate  with the government.
At the outset of the reforms, it was assumed that the Communist  Party and its nomenklatura'°
would strenuously resist or sabotage economic  reforms.  But government actions have proven successful
in neutralizing old guard resistance within the bureaucracy. Today at the national level, nomenklatura
power bases are largely marginalized  in all but Romania  and som^  republics  of Yugoslavia  (and of course,
the USSR and Albania).
The remaining  threat of the old guard comes  in two forms. First, public morale and support  for
the refonns  are damaged by perceptions that the nomenklatura are  continuing to receive economic
advantages. Second, substantial Party influence  remains in some of the regions and localities. In these
sub-national governments, which  are  charged with  delivering many public  services, entrenched
nomenklatura  may prevent the implementation  of central government reforms." 1
It is Eastern Europe's labor unions which may possess an even greater potential  to derail the
region's economic reforms, and respondents feel that averting that risk should be a priority government
objective.  Some unions have demonstrated  a capacity to block economic  reforms that might adversely
affect their constituents."2 Yet external observers are nol well-informed  about labor unions in Eastern
Europe.  Therefore, some suggest that a future study of the region's labor unions might be warranted  to
'"Nomenaklara m is the name given to Eastern Europe's privileged former elite.
"In light of the apparent reassertion of conservative  leadership forces in the Soviet Union, one
must acknowledge  the possibility  that the nomenklatura  could act as willing instruments  for any
conservative  political backlash in Eastern Europe.  IThis  serves to emphasize  the need for civil service
reform.
'X0n  example is the blocking of privatization  legislation  in Poland's parliament by labor union
interests seeking rights to worker self-management.
10clarify their present and future roles.  It would evaluate  their positions  on the reforms, and examine  the
merits of alterative  efforts to incorporate  them into the reform process."
Many sources express concern regarding a dangerous, popular 'expectations gap."  Their fear
is that present optimism will turn to a paralyzing  pessimism  as citizens  confront the difficult realities of
economic  restucturing.  Some argue  that clear exposition  to the public  of a medium-term,  comprehensive,
coherent and credible  program of economic  and social priorities, goals, policies and trade-offs would go
a long way toward bridging  this expectations  gap.
A failure to communicate  to economic agents a comprehensive  vision of the desired future
economic  order can inflict actual economic  costs.  For example, if a government  neglects to provide a
clear strategy, economic  agents will be less willing  to invest  in either physical capital  or their own human
capital.  Many of those interviewed  argue that little change can follow until the nrles of the game are
written," and that message is credibly communicated  (even if enunciating  a plan may circumscribe a
govemnment's  room  for  manoeuvre).  As  a  legacy of  misinformation and  concealment by  past
governments, it is felt that governments  must frankly present both the risks and the uncertainty  of the
outcome of reforms.'"
Communicating  the reform  program  message  demands  a deliberate  and honest  public information
effort in each country, aimed at citizens, businesses,  parliaments, and potential donors and investors.
Although some Eastern European  governments  are beginning  to act in this domain, they apparently  do not
have experience preparing credible public information programs.  The CSFR seems so far to  have
succeeded best in communicating  to  its people a realistic assessment  of its economic reform program,
along with the idea that the payoff will be many years in coming.  And at least for now, the program
retains generous popular support.  Historically, Hungary has  mounted impressive external public
"Such efforts might consist of inclusion  of labor unions in certain kinds of policy decisions; 'co-
determination"  on the West German  model, at the level of the firm; stipulation  with civil servants that
they trade their right to strike for the right to binding arbitration (as has been used successfully  in the
U.S. pubiic sector); finding ways to encourage cooperative,  independent  labor unions in place of
confrontational  unions; or encouragement  of competition  between labor unions, as has emerged in
Hungary and Poland.
"Starting points for devising  a reform program may be found in the national 'economic agenda'
documents  referenced in Footnote 2.
"Some respondents fear that, by advising  the public, interest groups will coalesce  against it.
Many others, including virtually all Eastern European respondents,  argue that the need to build
popular good-faith in government  calls for full disclosure  of transition policy (even at the cost of some
loss of direct policy impact).
11information  efforts. Romania  has recently  introduced  a public  information  office,  placing  it under  the
council  responsible  for the reform  program. It also  intends  to introduce  public  relations  at the city and
prefecure levels,  with  the stated  objective  of opening  these  councils'  decision-making  to the public.
Many of  those interviewed  call for external  technical  assistance  in public relations  and
information  (although  the issue's  highly  political  nature  probably  renders it unsuitable  for World  Bank
involvement). lTis  effort <would  be guided by three principles:  first, avoid raising expectations
unjustifiably  (such as Walesa's  pledge  to avoid any worker layoffs  during  the privatization  process);
second,  enhance  public  morale  and  support  by raising  the profile  of East European  success  stories;  and
third, recognize  that a neady-sequenced  program  is not realistic  in the present  context  of social and
economic  revolution.  It is critical  to distinguish  between  an effective  "public  information  effort"  and  the
aggressive  propaganda  campaigns  that were so familiar  under the previous  regimes. The former  might
include  putting  forward  government  spokespersons  to participate  in public  panels  and  debates,  or holding
seminars  and  discussions  in academic  institutions  and non-governmental  orgarizations.
As  part of these  public  information  efforts,  the  public  should  be educated  about  the nature  of a
market  economy  and about  citizens'  new relationship  to their governments.  This type of project  will
certainly  be difficult,  expensive,  and  time-consuming,  but respondents  feel  that it is essential  to gaining
enduring  support  from the populace. The mass media  methods  required  for this sort of education  are
analogous  to some  of those  discussed  under "CivU  Service  Reform."
(4)  Lack  of coodiation  of foreign istance.  ealdt.  ind  technical  assisace
The capacity  of government  ministers  and domestic  admiaistrations  has been strained by
incoming  visitors  from  the 24 OECD  countries,  the multilateral  institutions,  creditors'  representatives,  and
numerous  academic  and non-governmental  organizations.  Such  contacts  are taxing,  given  that ministry
staffs are small and that each foreign  institudon  has its own demands,  rules, and procedures. Many
respondents  stress  that improved  coordination  of foreign  assistance,  debt,  and  technical  assistance  would
help  alleviate  the confusion,  inefficiencies,  and  bureaucratic  fatigue  that these  extensive  foreign  contacts
can engender.
It would also appear that some countries  have failed to exploit many available  sources of
financial  and technical  assistance  - especially  from non-governmental  organizations  - due to a lack of
information  about  them.  An informational  clearinghouse  has been suggested  as a way to help match
domestic  needs  to willing  donors.
12But the main reason for improving coordination  is to help governments  insdtute measures  that
are consistent  with the central reform  objectives  and with each other. Enhanced  coordination  would help
govemments achieve stabilization  and economic  reform more efficiently  and rapidly.  Moreover, to be
sustainable politically, a reform program must be credible.  One important factor in establishing  such
credibility is the internal consistency  of a program's various components.
Some governments will establish new formal coordination  agencies.  Others will designate
existing entities as  istitutional focal points.  The CSFR has proposed a "Foreign Investment and Aid
Agency" for coordinat-on. e"-a!uation,  and approval of foreign capital inflows.  It will also receive
technical assistance  in coordinating  aid and as part of its financial  system restructuring  project.  Bulgaria
is developing  an Aid Coordination  Agency, with a broadly representative  board but no independent  staff,
as well as an inter-ministerial  aid coordination  group.  Poland has developed a debt office, the debt
management  capabilities  of which are now being strengthened. In some countries, thought  is also being
given to consolidating  this collection  of coordination  mechanisms  under a single agency responsible  for
overall coordination  of the reforms.
Coordination  by external  agencies  has the advantage  of not placing  frither administrative  burdens
on the already-overtaxed  government bureaucracies  of Eastern Europe.  However, such a coordinating
locus risks being woutside  the loop," in terms of input from ministries and intimate knowledge  of the
system. This might argue for limiting  external  coordination  efforts to an advisory role, such as help from
resident World Bank missions  in setting priorities.
Several - perhaps too many  - external  organizations  are candidates  for taking the lead role in
coordinating  foreign assistance, extenal debt, and technical assistance. These include among others the
IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the EBRD, and the EC.  Of these, the OECD has the unique advantage
of not being a lender.  Even though the OECD's Centre for Cooperation  with European Economies  in
Transition currently has a staff of only four people, one respondent  in the OECD identified  it as a locus
that could conceivably  evolve into a secretariat capable  of taking on a coordinating  role.  Others question
the capacity  of the OECD  to play this role.  Alternatively,  multilateral  agencies  might examine  the relative
merits of  turning this task over to  one of  the few international, non-profit organizations of public
administrators  which claim to have expertise in this area.
"Czechoslovakia, like Romania, presently has litle external  debt to be concerned  with.
13CHANG2MIGTHE  ROLE OF GOVRNMENNT  IN SOCIET
(1)  Trfansfomgn th  central  eoverment bureacracy frmM eerno  of the  WeoDla  to  ervant
of its CitiZeDi
Literatre on  the communist  governments  in Eastern  Europe  tends  to characterize  them  as having
supplied  their citizens'  basic  needs  (via a system  of job security,  subsidized  consumption,  an  univeral
access  to basic  health  care and  education),  while  awarding  the perquisites  and  punishments  of the system
according  to ambiguous  and  changing  rules and  norms. Country  position  papers  (see  footnote  2) indicate
that the citizens  of post-communist  Eastern  Europe  are now hoping  to obtain  both the familiar  basic
securities  as well  as new  freedoms  and  rights. 17
Yet many  doubt  that the  day-to-day  relationship  between  society  and  government  has advanced
substantially.  Burdensome  administrative  and  regulatory  procedures  persist  - evidenced  by the numerous
steps typically  still required  to register  a small business  - failing  to reflect changes  at the level of
macroeconomic  policy.
At the same  time, newly-emerging  interest  groups  across  the region  are exercising  an active
voice concerning  the environment,  consumer  protection,  business  opporouity, and occupational  safety;
and the clamor  to be heard seems  to have grown  faster  than the governments'  capacity  to listen. The
assessment  is that Eastemn  Europe's  transformations  will require  commensurate  governmental  change  on
three fronts: (1) replacing  and retraining  top managers;  (2) developing  communication  channels  between
citizens  and  their governments;  and (3) ensuring  that  civil  servants  are held  accountable  for their actions.
(The  last issue  is discussed  in *Civil  Service  Reforn.")
All governments  have taken action  on the first front, having  replaced  the top-most  layer of
ministry  management  (with  some  exceptions  in Romania  and Bulgaria). Yet a few more management
layers  probably  need  to be replaced  to change  the  culture  of a ministry.  This  will  be a major  undertaking,
however, given the lack of processes  to  identify  qualified  incumbent  managers,  the absence  of a
functioning  labor  markets  for managers,  and the shortage  of skilled  replacements.
Some  respondents  suggest  that communication  channels  both  to and from  the government  need
to be developed.  Part of this effort  might  be for governments  to adopt  legal  assurances  granting  citizens
"Some  of these  demands  are inconsistent,  and so governments  will have  to make  trade-offs. For
example,  guaranteed  employment  continues  to be seen  largely  as an entitlement.  Since  this conflicts
with  other restructring goals,  it may  have  to be replaced  by a package  of measures:  suport to the
unemployed,  retraining,  and enhanced  labor  mobility.
14access to any unclassified information  about govenment activities (a *freedom  of information code).
Another might be to introduce the institution  of parliamentary testimony under oath by government
officials.  Such measures would help parliaments, the media and interest groups in their role as public
watchdogs.  Without such guarantees, information can only be obtained haphazardly  - as with the
sensationalized  news accounts  of scandalous  spontaneous  privatizations.
Governments  will also need to institutionalize  channels  for receiving  and responding  to citizens'
input.  Such channels  enhance government  accountability  (both in fact and in appearance)  and so help to
alleviate potentially explosive political pressures.  They also can help protect citizens from arbitrary
actions by the government. One such channel might be a citizens' advocate  office, as was introduc6d  in
Poland in 1988.
(2)  Evolvine devolution  of central governmen  owers and responsibilities
The devolution  of significant  powers and responsibilities  to elected legislatures  and subnational
governments has already advanced a great distance"'  - even though their capacities and capabilities  are
uneven.' 9 The  development needs  of  Eastern  Europe's  elected  legislatures are  discussed  in
"Strengthening  Elected  Legislatures' (page  7), leaving  the present  section  to focus on decentralization  from
central to subnational  governments.
In Eastern Europe, subnational  "govermnents"  previously  were structured  as arms of the central
government.  The recent devolution  of power to regional and local governments  is widely viewed as a
positive development: decentralization as a  means of  restoring democratic rights.  Yet the rise of
subnational  governments complicates  the reform process in a number  of ways.-
"Among the governments  covered in this study, only Romania's still manifests extreme
reservations about the movement  away from central government  jurisdiction. For example,  Romanian
government's reform program retains food subsidies, central government  administration  of social
programs, state investment  in production, and a massive  role for  state orders'  from enterprises.
'9Analogously,  central govenments are generally already committed  to withdrawing  from
enterprise management, as well as from much of the direct mangement of the economy.
"Consider the example  of environmental  protection  policy.  There are three main implications  to
having subnational  governmens become responsible:  (a) since environmental  concerns tend to arise at
the local level, those affected will be well-positioned  to assess and prioritize them; (b) local
governments may have an even lesser capability  than national governments  to analyze  the economic
considerations of enviromental policy; and (c) many environmental  problems extend beyond local
jurisdictions.  Devolution  of power to localities will thus still require national-level  environmental
coordination among localities, enforcement  of clear property rights, and technical assistance  from
IsMost governments  have not yet resolved the question of what model of central-regional-local
government relations they wIll adopt.  This is necessarily a political process, and so will take time to
resolve.  Meanwhile, some reforms and projects have been put on hold pending designation of the
appropriate  authorities. Respondents  believe  that laws clearly  defining  the  jurisdictionsand  responsibilities
of each level of goverment  could alleviate  critical uncertainties.
Decentralization complicates the implementation  of reforms, in that measures approved by
national legislatures risk derailment if subnational  governments  are not "on board.'  And building  local
government institutions  must have high priority across the region, since the domain of local and regional
govemments wIll encompass  communal  services,  housing, much  of regulatory  administration,  the delivery
of health care and poverty assistance,  and parts of the education  and transportation  systems. Some forns
of private sector pronotion will also take place at the local level.
Having operated mainly at the national  level, the donor community  knows relatively  little about
the structure and shortcomings  of subnational  governments in Eastern Europe.  Still, respondents feel
sufficiently  informed  to identify  three broad deficiencies:  rudimnentary  operating  systens, insufficient  and
poorly-trained staff, and an undeveloped  capacity to raise revenue.  Subnational  governments  will have
to be  strengthened to  enable them to handle their broad new responsibilities.  Otherwise, the good
intentions of central governments, evidenced in the flurry of  reform legislation, will not reach the
implementation  stage.
Hungary and Poland have taken concrete steps to strengten  the capacity of local governments.
In Hungary, the central government  consults the 'Association of Local Self Governments on all relevant
draft legislation. It has also introduced  a sweeping, comprehensive  local government reform law, which
will transfer substantial  authority, assets, and taxing authority. Poland has established  a new, high-profile
office charged with reforms at the local level, and has stepped-up  revenue-sharing  and asset transfers for
municipalities.
T'he  heavy demands likely to be placed on local governments  warrant a study of their capacity,
like that already prepared for Hungary (Davey, 1990). Further, respondents  tend to argue for beginning
to address certain immediate needs for technical assistaace and training even before the governments
undertake such studies.  Hungary has relied for technical assistance and training on local government
donors.
The first World Bank environmental  loan in the region, for a small Environment  Management
Project in Poland, is a model of careful and complete  desip.  It seeks to help the country evaluate
priorities, strengthen operational procedures, coordinate  dcnor activities, and improve communication
channels between central and sub-national  governments. It also includes components  for technical
assistance, training, and institutional  twinning.
16specialists  from  foreign  academies  of public  administration.  And  in  the CSFR,  the  government's  Lnstites
for Local  Govenment  and  for Local  Adminitration  assess  municipal  capacity  issues.
Donor  governments  (national  and  subnational)  also  are beginning  to participate. For example,
USAID  has earmarked  S5  million  specifically  for subnational  government  development  in Eastern  Europe.
Ihese donors may be called upon to impart their particular expertise in the areas of allocating
administrative  and political  turfs, and of revenue-sharing  arrangements. In addition,  the World  Bank
intends to initiate a cross-ountry study of local govermnent  issues in Poland, Hungary, and Romania.
One  effect  of decentralization  is that  it increase  the need  to reform  the tax system:  without  tax
reform, decentralization  might undermine  the tax system and thereby endanger  macro-stabilizadon
programs. Subnational  government  operations  in Eastern  Europe  will initially  have  to rely primarily  on
central  government  fimancial  support,  but will  presumably  have  to develop  independent  revenue  sources.
Given  local  resource-mobilization  problems,  permanent  arrangements  will  still  involve  central  govermnent
revenue-sharing.  Under  such arrangements,  objective  and transparent  norms will replace  the current
hybrid  systems  of negotiations,  norms  and discretion. It has been  suggested  that OECD  governments'
methods  of local taxation  and their inter-regional  revenue  arrangements  might provide models  (and
technical  assistants)  for the East. In addition,  Hungary  implemented  local  government  reforms  over the
past few years, and  may  itself  be well-positioned  to offer advice  that is tailored  to the conditions  of the
region.
Another  issue involves  the tendency  in Eastern  Europe  for autonomous  municipalities  to be
divided  into  very small  units. This  tendency  raises  questions  about  their  capacity  to handle  public  finances
properly  and to deliver  public  services. In Poland,  the capacity  constraints  of villages  will be addressed
by mechanisms  to arrange  cooperation  among  villages  for ctain  functions  or by conting  out  functions
to private  agents.
World Bank  training  staff note that, in the OECD  countries,  central  governments  and non-
governmental  organizations  offer  training  seminars  and  reference  materials  to newly-elected  local  policy-
makers. In Eastern  Europe,  nearly  all local  office-holders  are new  and relatively  untrained,  so the need
for quick  training  is far greater. For the near-terw,  it was  suggested  that  assistance  be given  immediately
to Eastern  Europe  to translate  reference  materials  and to develop  and implement  short courses  in local
public adminisat-ion. This aid might be channelled  througb  training  centers  for local government
officials,  such as those  set up across  Poland  through  private  non-profit  efforts.
A few  of those  in  iewed  note,  that  the  World  Bank  lacks  a mandate  for assisting  in the  political
process of designing  subnational  government  relations.  However,  the World Bank may wish to
commission  studies  of particular  subnational  opeting  systems  and their strengths  and weaknesses,  and
17identify  the appropriate  level  of goverament  for the delivery  of a particular  kind  of government  service.
Donors wil  also be asked to help fance  what  are  bound to be very  expensiv  training and  technical
assistance  programs.
In most instances,  it is assumed  that  donors  will be obliged  to initiate  assistance  to subnational
levels  of government  indirecty via the central  government.  Central  governments  will retain  the role of
approving,  coordinatng,  and maiAging  external  assistance.  Nonetheless,  many  would  encourage  central
governments  to allow  expanded  outside  contacts  with regional  and local  entities  (including  contacts  with
foreign  subnational  govenments),  in order  to spur  development  in this neglected  area.  Of course,  care
must be taken to ensure that local-level  thical  assistance  be coordinated  with national-level  policies.
A major implication  of the new decetalization is that the central  governmt  will no longer
automatically  receive  information  about  economic  agents  via administrative  channels. As a result, the
government  is losing  some  of its access  to essential  economic  data  - data it needs  from the emerging
private  sectors  for macroeconomic  policy-making;  external  debt  management;  tax  administration;  and  the
protection  of the environment,  of investors  (from  frauid),  and  of workers  (from  occupational  hazards  and
unfair labor practices). Overcoming  this loss of information  requires  that govenments  restore  their
capacity  to collect  information  - either  by collecting  information  itself  or by aggregating  information
collected  by subnational  govanments.
One part of rehabilitating  governments'  capacity  to collect  information  involves  building  (or
rebuilding)  the national  apparats for the collection  and  evaluationof  economic  statistics  (already  discussed
on page  4 in 'Policy-Making  Capacity"). Another  distinct  component  is the introduction  of an effective
system  of mandatory  fincial  disclosure  requirements  for subnational  goverments, so as to enhance
transparency  and therefore  govenment legitimacy. Local govenment disclosure  requirements  will
improve financial  accountability  for funds granted from central governments,  and Zeip  avoid the
anticipated  corruption  problem  at the local-level.
It is felt that, as a general  principle,  information  and control  can no longer  issue  hierarchically
from the central  govermnent.  Information  flows  will necessarily  consist  of networks  among  aU  agents,
which  will develop  naturally. Such networks  have many  components,  including  access  to government
information,  communication  across ministries,  information-sharing  among  governments,  and greater
inclusion  of the government  bureaucracy  and  the private  sector  in policy  formulation.21
2tThe  operational  significance  of these is discussed  in the sections  *Policy  Making  Capacity,
'Maintainng Political  Support,'  Coordination,'  and "Devolution  of Central  Government.'
18(3)  LiwaIg  obs.lnk  Lz  mmlu  uno
Many  of those interviewed  are encouraged  by the relative  ease  with which  Eastern  Europe's
reformers  have shut down obsolete  bureaucratic  structures. Throughout  the region, central  planning
ministies died along with the demise of command economies.'  Nearly all of the region has enacted
impressive  and rapid price decontrol, allowing  govenments  to eliminate  or shrink  their price-setting
offices. 2'  Finally,  under the old system,  each  "branch"  (i.e., individual-industry)  ministry  acted  as the
head  office  of its industry,  managing  enterprises  as subsidiaries.  With  control  devolving  to the enterprises,
the need for branch  ministries  evaporated. In response,  every country  in the region consolidated  its
branch  ministries  into a single,  much  smaller  Ministry  of Industr9' on the Wester European  model.
Even  though  the closing  of these  agencies  had overwhelming  popular  support,  one might  have
expected  greater difficulty  in shutting  them  down.  For one thing, the functional  vacuum  left by the
closure  of a national-level  agency (even  one which  performs  badly) might have caused  nationwide
economic  disruptions.  For another,  civil  servants  might  have  used  their  clout  to prevent  job loss,  fighting
the closing  through  political  channels.
Aside from Poland, which  has witnessed  substantial  layoffs  of civil servants,  governments
deferred  the employment  issue  by limiting  layoffs.21  However,  there  is a wide  diversity  of opinion  about
whether  civil  servants  from liquidated  government  agencies  can  be recycled  usefilly  into  new  government
functions.  Some  governments  outside  the region  have  apparently  succeeded  in turning  civil  servants  that
formerly  obstructed  the market  into functionaries  that serve  a pro-market  role.  Yet most observers  of
2A  (much  diminished)  planning  apparatus  still exists  only in Poland,  where  it was downgraded
from a ministry  to an office. The World  Bank  recommended  moving  this  office  to the Ministry  of
Finance,  and charging  it with  multi-year  fiscal  planning.
"Only in Romania  has there  been  halting  progress  in and a lack  of political  commitment  to price
liberalization.
2'Civil  servants  from these  offices  now  tend  to serve  the relatively  minor  role of price monitoring.
2In  Czechoslovakia,  branch  ministries  were consolidated  into  a single  ministry,  but the Republics
have so far only succeeded in reducing slightly the number  of branch ministries.
2Many of these countries simply  transferred  redundant  civil servants to other ministries.  For
example,  the former  planning  staffs  typically  dispersed  to state  enterprises,  the Ministry  of Industry
(for sectoral  planners),  and the Ministry  of Finance  (for  macroeconomic  planners);  and  many
retrenched  employees  of branch  ministries  went  to enterprises  in their  formerly-subsidiary  sector.
Nonetheess,  large mnmbers  of employees  in obsolete  agencies  found  employment  in the private  sector,
or in education  and research.
19Eutean Europe  are quite  pessimistic,  citing  a gross mismatch  of skills, experience  and attitudes. For
insmce,  it was suggested  that former  planners  be used to develop  longer-term  macro-economic  and
sectoral  strategies. However,  many  doubt  the possibility  of conveting former  cental planners  from
quntity allocators  to advisors,  promoters,  and financial  regulators. Similarly,  some  officials  proposed
puting pricing  offices  in charge  of price libetalization  and  fair compettion,  but doubts  that  price office
staffs  can be productively  transformed  have  held sway.
As  an example  of an alterative strategy,  it was  suggesd that  te  government  encourage  former
staff  of planning  and  branch  ministries  to operate  trade and  seavice  associations  or consultancies  for their
industry  (as some  sectoral  planners  have  apparently  done  in Poland). Although  the principle  has received
support  from  firms,  other  observers  express  concem  that  these  might  a  as mechanisms  for rent-seeking,
collusion  and  market  monopolization.
20The controlling  role of government  in forme  command  economies  is necessarily  changing
dramatically.  A variety  of institutional  changes  will be critical  to transforming  these  institutions,  so that
they  can  instead  act to promote  and  reguate the market  economy.  Where  functions  cannot  be carried  out
by transforming  exisdng  agencies,  new  institutions  will  develop.
For Eastern  European  governments,  designing  new government  systems  risks conflicting  with
the desire  to shrink  central  govemment.  For this reason,  particular  attention  should  be paid  to initiating
programs  that minimize  central  government  involvement.  A number  of observers  urge governments  and
their advisors  to consider  private  provision  of services  that might  otherwise  be delivered  by government.
Many  also  expect  local  goverments  increasingly  to provide  public  goods  and  services,  such  as  job training
and unemployment  benefits. One  respondent  also recommended  that governments  make  explicit  which
functions  are transitional,  and  the manner  in which  they  will  be dismantled.
It is evident  that  governments  are  severely  constrained  in  their  capacity  to implement  the required
new systems,  and so respondents  suggested  a variety  of ways  they  might  economize  on implementation.
For instance,  governments  might  offer their employees  incentive  awards  for suggesting  innovations  that
enhance  technical  and managerial  efficiency.
As another  example,  where  economic  and  legal  expertise  are limited,  the wholesale  adoption  of
a foreign  country's  system  may  sometimes  make  sense,  rather  than  using  time and  resources  to invent  a
new system.  This might help countries  avoid both mistakes  and the disruption  caused  by ensuing
corrections. Of course,  the appropriateness  of a foreign  system  depends  on many  characteristics  of the
country,  and limited  adaptations  to local  conditions  will therefore  often  be necessary.
'Twinning' arrangements,  whereby  a public  or private  Eastern  European  institution  is paired
with a foreign  analogue,  have  begun  on a limited  and ad-hoc  basis.'  Such arrangements  are used to
facilitate  many  types  of technical  assistance,  exchanges,  and  training,  across  a wide  array  of institutions.
Some  respondents  believe  that  a major  expansion  of government  institutional  twinning  would  decentralize
institutional  development  assistance  and might  help  speed  its implementation.
2'Among  the many  examples,  Eastern  European  securities  regulators  have  been  paired  up with  the
U.S. SEC, broadcasters  with  West  European  television  companies,  local  governments  with municipal
governments  in the U.S., management  institutes  with  business  schools  in Europe  and  the U.S., and
social  welfare  agencies  with  the U.S. Departnent  of Health  and  Human  Services.
21(1)  Lgladreguaoyrfr
Legal  and regulatory systems are by  their  nature extremely detailed, nuanced, and vary
dramatically  across  countries. A generalized  summary  of legal  and regulatory  reform  runs  a high  risk  of
missing  critical  exceptions  and caveats. Since  each  topic  offers  the scope  for a separate,  in-depth  paper,
the contribution  of this section  is merely  to point out some areas where  action is lagging  and some
particular  cautionary  observations. Forunately, it seems  that the Socialist  Economies  division  of the
World  Bank  will be undertaing a study  of legal reforms  in Easter Europe.
More than in any other area of concern, governments  are under pressure to "get it right the first
time." It is feared  that legal and regulatory  uncertainty  or vacillations  will kill off private  investment
plans,  particularly  foreign  investment.  Therefore,  Eastern  Europe's  govnmerts  are asking  that  donors
provide  timely  technical  assistance  to design  legislation,  regulations,  and  mechanisms  for enforcement  and
dispute  resolution. A good deal of technical  assistance  for legal reforms  is already in place.2  In
contrast,  foreign  regulatory  expertise  is apparently  harder  to come  by and  few  advisors  are  working  in this
area as yet.
For several  reasons,  legal and regulatory  reforms  wil take substantial  time.  As explained,
reforms  must  be carefully  crafted  and will require  extensive  external  assistance.  Some  also  believe  that
reforns have  been  delayed  due  to financial  conflicts  of interest  among  some  of those  in power. Moreover,
there  is an enormous  volume  of legislation  to rewrite,  and  the reforms  are subject  to parliamentary  debate.
In addition,  the design  of legal and regulatory  reforms  must take Eastern  Europe's severe
implementation  capacity  constraints  sufficiently  into  account.  For instance,  Poland's  three  personal  income
tax rates  makes  sense;  Romania's  66 corrorate  tax rate  increment  do not. Similarly,  regulations  that  are
relatively  self-enforcing  are more  implementable  than  ones  which  reqaire  extensive  on-site  verification.
Local  governments  will  be charged  with  the  actual  implementation  of legal  and  regulatory  system
reforms. As  discussed  in "Evolving  Devolutionof  Central  Goverment  Role"  (page  15),  foreign  advisors
know  little  about  local government  except  that  its capacity  is typically  weak. Thus, donors  will  have  to
analyze  local  government  capacities  before  they  can help  national  governments  to design  reforms.
Some  of those interviewed  stress the value of preparing  a blueprint  for legal and regulatory
reform  to assist countries  in coordinaing  and packaging  these inter-related  reforms. Such  an exercise
would  sum  up the  goals  of the reforms,  the  specific  regulatory  and  other  legal  changes  needed  to meet  the
2AIthough  Romania  and  Bulgaria  seem  to have  suffered  due  to their isolation  from legal  expertise
up until  recenly.
22goals, and the actions taken to date.  For example, Bulgaria's reform blueprint (Rahn et al, 1990) was
prepared by a collection of government  leaders and domestic  and foreign advisors, in consultation  with
business  and labor intees.  It includes  a detailed  review  of regulatory  and legal reforms  to promote
business  activity  and  foreign  investment.  Hungary  and  Romania  have  also  taken  stock  of the current  status
of legal  reforms  and written  a roadmap  of future  needed  legislation.  In the other countries,  the process
is much  less formal  and not organized  for the endre economy.
Legl  issues
Conact  enforcement and dispute resolution remain undeveloped, calling for  reforms in
commercial  and investment  codes, and property, administrave,banking, and bankruptcy  laws, etc.  Yet
the introduction  of new laws is hampered by a lack of domestic legal expertise.Y Writing new laws
tend, to be a haphazard  process of cutting-and-pastiag  bits of Western countries' laws, the outcome often
being overly-interventionist  and inconsistent  reform legislation  of quite variable quality.
Romania  and Bulgaria  are implementing  shortterm reforms, and included  foreip help in drafting
new laws as a component of technical assistance  and other loans.  Poland is tapping into a variety of
sources: bilateral grant monies for technical assistance,  pro bono work by foreign private law firms; and
grants to help civil servants to develop legal skills in specific reform areas.  In most respects, national
governments and private law firms have a comparadve  advantage over the multilateral institutions in
drafting legislation, although some warn that the process should also include economics expertise, to
assure consistency  of the programs with the economic  goals of the reform.
Another means  of economizing  on limited  legal expertise  and time might be for Eastern  European
countries to  adopt legal systems from market economies with which they share ties or history, and
preferably ones which are at a similar stage of development. In general, simple laws should be the
watchword, in order to avoid  either overwhelming  the country's implementation  capacity  or inducing  rent-
seeking behavior and corruption.
The long-term solution to the shortage  of legal expertise will be improved and expanded  legal
education: one of those interviewed  specified that this might include  placement of law school professors
in foreign law schools, law school  educational  exchanges,  and placement  of lawyers  into foreign  firms and
government  agencies.
2 "Hungary is a fortnate  exception.
23Regulatory 1sue
Ihere  is a  strongly-held perception that existing, inflexible regulatory systems may thwart
entrepreneurial  activity and foreign investment. Yet these laws and methods, as well as their arbitrary
enforcement, have not changed much, and there is some dispute as to whether regulatory reform is a
matter of primary imnportance.
Two approaches  to regulatory reform have been suggested. Some would like to see a massive,
item-by-item  rewriting of regulations.  Maiy  others argue that the existing regulatory system is not
salvageable. They would essentially  dismantle economic  regulations, and then build up a rudimentary
replacement system as required by the economy.?  The design of a comprehensive  regulatory reform
could then follow.
The World Bank has taken an intermediate  position  in Czechoslovakia,  where it recommended
the establishment  of a temporary governmental  deregulation  taskforce 3' to undertake a systematic  study
of the regulatory system and propose an action plan for reform.  Such a study might consider  the burdens
faced by businesses due to both regulations and administrative  procedures.  And its recommendations
would necessarily be informed by governments' severe regulatory capacity constraints.
The state's role in the region's new regulatory systems will generally  be at arm's length.  For
instance, it is expected  that governments  will not continue  to manage state enterprises  direcly.  Given the
misalignment of government and firm incentives, and the lack of qualified civil servants to manage
businesses, a government  agency  will instead  likely establish  a board of directors for each public company
and then supervise its performance  from a distance."
Regulatory technical assistance  has been offered from many bilateral and multilateral  sources.
It  is well-advanced in Poland in the areas of  anti-trust, commercial, and securities policies.  Such
assistance  has also begun more recently in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
'Mhe economic  principle of the new system would no longer be control activity, but to correct for
market failures.  The guiding legal principle  would be *everything  not explicitly  forbidden  is permitted."
"One suggested approach would exploit the self-interest  of the citizenry, by using business and
consumer  representatives  for such a taskforce.  This might involve simply  maintaining regular contacts
with these representatives,  or else opening a small office to receive ideas about regulatory problems  from
the public.
'This  is exacly the current approach of Hungary's State Property Agency.  Hungary perceives  this
system as a precursor to near-total  privatization  over the next few years.  Other countries could  be
expected  to perform this same role for many years before a major portion of their state enterprises  would
be sold off.
24(2)  blic  finac  efom
Tatlion  and Revenue
In the nea-term, structural  adjustment  in Eastem  Europe  threatens  government revenues:
macroeconomic  changes  are transforming  exisdng  tax bases,  privatization  will eliminate  governments'
direct control  over company  dividends  and prics,  and at the same  time  governments  face increased
demands  for transition-related  expenditure. Literature  on the subject  notes that this threat creates a
challenge  for governments  to maintain  and  restore  existing  revenue  sources,  and  to experiment  with  new
sources.
Thanks  to IMF and World  Bank  technical  assistance,  tax policy  reform  is cutrently  underway
across  the region." 3 Nevertheless,  the reform of institutions  related  to taxation  has advanced  only
negligibly.  The IMF anticipates  conducting  country  surveys  of tax  administradon  capabilities  in the near
future, and  thereafter  developing  a reform  strategy  for each. In the meantime,  lnowledge  of this  subject
is very sparse  and  commentary  on it is rather  more  speculative  than  on most  other issues  covered  in this
paper.
According  to respondents,  simplicity  and  uniformity  will  rank  among  the  foremost  considerations
in overbauling  the system  of taxes and other revenues  (in order to assure  both equity  and ease of
admninistration  and enforcement).  For example,  collecting  taxes  from  individuals  may  be difficult,  and
governments  will  certainly  depend  to some  extent  on tax withholding  by employers.  It has  been  suggested
as well  that  income  taxes  might  also  be collected  at source  for dividends,  interest,  and  the fringe  benefits
of managers  and  employees.
Under  the former  system,  the  state enterprise  sector  served  as the  main  source  of goverment
revenue. As a result, governments  developed  very  little  capacity  to collect  revenue  or fight  tax evasion.
Moreover,  it appears  that  the governments  of the  region  do wt filly recognize  the urgency  of initiating
active  efforts  to develop  this  capacity.
Given  the  enormous  new  need  for tax administration,  respondens  express  concern  that  attempts
to impose complex Western European taxes may be misguided. 2'  Rather, many  fee that goverments
"A comprehensive  tax reform  was  implemented  in Hungary. Bugaria,  Czechoslovakia,  and
Poland  have  pending,  IMF-approved  reform  legislation.  However,  progress  in Romania  and especially
Yugoslavia  is much  less  assured.
"However,  reforms  must  also be made  with  an eye to fiscal  compatibility  with  Westen Europe  -
particularly  regarding  the VAT  and customs  tariffs  - to facilitate  increasing  integration  with  the
European  Community.
25should  look more to model system used in counties of a simiar level of economic  development.
Technical  assistance  in tax administrion might  therefore  be sought  from  the tax authorities  and finance
ministries  of the newly  industrialized  economies.  These  foreign  ageacies  might  also serve  as sources  of
training  for civil servants  to beef up their capacity  to desip  tax policy, to administer  tax and other
revenue  systems,  and  to audit  the private  and state-enteprise  seo0rs.
As  privatization  proceeds,  goverments' direct  information  links  to the  economy  weaken  further.
Yet governments  have a vital interest  in ensuring  their access  to certain  kinds  of corporate  financial
information. Tle governments  of Eastem  Europe  intend  to impose  standard  requirements  for financial
disclosure,  reportig. and  auditing  on corporations  that are traded  on public  stock  exchanges.  However,
the need  for public  access  to information  argues  for exding  these  requirements  to all corporations.?6
Budgeting
Outside  of Hungary  and Poland,  litde is known  among  donors  about  the region's  systems  for
budget  preparation,  approval,  and execution. In Hungary  and Poland,  the IMF recently  evaluated  the
budgeting  methods  being used at the time, finding  them to be entirely  incompatible  with the modern
systems  used in capitalist  economies.  In 1989,  the IMF installed  systems  in Hungary  that conform  with
internaional  budgeting  conventions  (but  has not yet proceeded  to do so in Poland). It appears  that the
IMF will eventually  follow  the same  procedure  of diagnosis  and reform  in the other  countries  of Eastern
Europe.
Once  accounting  stndards are in place  and accountants  trained (or foreign  accounting  firms
contracted),  governments  can  proceed  to establish  criical  auditing  mechanisms  for their  own  finances,  and
for the finances  of state-owned  enterprises  and subnational  govenments. They will also need simple
systems  to audit  their  own  operational  effectiveness,  so as to remedy  program  deficiencies  and  refer  cases
of malfeasance  and  non-feasance  to the appropriate  authorities.  For each  of these  auditing  functions,  the
perception  of objectivity  and independence  is critical.
Rudimentary  financial  auditing  infrasucture exists in some  countries. The parliaments  of
Hungary  and  Poland  have  a State  Audit  Committee  and an Inspector  General,  respectively.  However,  the
objectivity  of their budgetary  audits  has been questioned,  and their small staffs and lack of routinized
"Reasons  for guaranteeing  information  flows  include  the prevention  of income  tax evasion,
fairness  in labor  relations,  and  environmental,  consumer  and investor  protection.
3See Rice (1990). It has been  suggested  that  universa reporting  requirements  might  be viewed  as
the price of having limited liability status.
26systems limit the quality and scope of their work.  Poland's Govenment Auditor performs functional
audits of government operations  which elicit both press attention  and responsiveness  from the rest of the
goverment.  And Poland's Attorney General investigates  fraud.  At least at this point, such offices are
highly political, and they should be strengthened  both in governments  and elected legislatures.
It  has been suggested that the decentralization  of  govnment  administration prior to  the
imposition  of financial  controls has added to economic  instability in the region.  Modern accounting  and
auditing systems are now being installed in Hungary and Poland, and the rest of the region will soon
follow.  It is likely that central governments  will have to establish financial control over subnational
governments  and state enterprises, through budgeting  and accounting  standards and financial disclosure
requirements.
The governments  of Eastern  Europe have  made  some budgetary  reforms  independently,  but these
have been ad hoc.  Moreover, these governments  possess very limited capacity for making multiple-year
projections of current expenditure  or investment  strategy for government  operations and infrastructure.
On the whole, budgeting and planning outcomes are quite loose and fluid.  For example, the category
'Other'  comprises  nearly 30% of Poland's central government  budget.  The IMP has naturally taken a
leading role in providing technical assistance  for budgetary  reform, and it can also be expected  to do so
for training in this area.  Specific suggestions from respondents regarding budgetary reform include
introducing a formalized system of competitive  bidding for procurement,3 and creating an independent
procurement  oversight department, perhaps located in a government  auditor's office.
With regard to public investment, experts  identify  a regionwide  failure of governments  to apply
standard rate-of-return criteria, and they question  the project assessment  capabilities  of the governments
of Eastern Europe. They fear that the new governments  are overly-cautious  in borrowing  for investment.
And they worry that market forces will not act as useful signals, given the region's continuing price
distortions, undeveloped  capital markets, and foreign  exchange  shortages. Finally, they point to the poor
quality of civil, mechanical  and electrical engineering  in the region - which may impede governments'
capacity to design, assess, operate, and regulate  projects - and note that the World Bank's interlocutors
fail to appreciate the extent of these shortcomings.
For  the near-term,  goverments  wIll require technical assistance to  undertake a  careful
prioritization  of investment  projecs.  Respondents  believe that the most urgent priorities can readily be
identified. These should be specifically  targeted  to the identifiable  needs of private enterprise. Given the
"See G, Vecchietti (1991), 'Steps to Effectve Government  Contracting  with Private Businesses,"
Institute of Public Administration  mimeo.
27extent of unutilized capacity of exsting public investments,  etphasis  should be on the rehabilitation  of
existing assets.  An evaluation  of specific training needs should also be undertaken now, to assist Eastern
Europe's governments  to develop independent  capabilities  in project design, assessment, and management
for the medium-term."
Respondents  question  the fiscal  and administrative  capacity  of Eastern  European  governments
to provide  needed  investment.  Some  suggest  a study  of the possibility  of devolving  certain  projec  and
functions  to the private  sector.3 Liberalization  of private  investment  rules and  procedures,  as in Poland,
would  naturally  be a prerequisite  to such  a reform.
(3)  Civil  service  reform
The governmens  of Eastern  Europe  have  paid  almost  no attention  to civil  service  reform,  even
though it is their eivil servants  who must implement  planned reforms.  And in large part, those
interviewed  admit  to being  ill-informed  about  the systems'  operating  methods  and capacities,  as well  as
the skills, knowledge,  and  atitudes  of civil servants. Many  issues  that concern  the civil service  are also
general  labor  market  issues,  and  this  section  does  not  consider  them. Instead  it looks  only  at explicit  civil
service issues.
Governments  have  apparently  not conceivad  of their employees  as a bureaucracy-wide  'civil
service." They  have  yet to develop  any  comprehensivestategies  for re-orienting,  retrenching,  retraining,
and redeploying  their staffs,  let alone  for building  an organic  and non-ideological  civil service  system.
Currently,  these civil services have fbmr  bwoad  problem areas: staff and skills shortages,  low and
compressed  salary  scales,  the residual  bureauctic  cultre of the former  regimes,  and  job mismatch.
There  is  unanimous  concern  saout  Eastern  Europe's  civil  servants'  ability  to manage  their  reform
programs.  Although  the socialized  secums  of Eastern  Europe's economies  are vast, their central
government  civil seices  are suprisingly  small. Staffing  levels  in government  ministries  are fairly  low
in absolute terms, as a fiaction of the overall labor force, and in comparison to the share of central
government  in market  economies.
-"As in Hungary,  twinning*  of Bastern  European  civil servants with foreign infrastructure  and
tnsportation project  aalog  will likely  be a significant  component  of this training.
"In Romanian  fstructure,  for example,  areas  suggested  by the World  Bank  for private
invesment  include  roads,  communications,  public  utilities,  and  agricultural  infrastruclure.
"Sources:  Proprietary  government  and World  Bank  data, and  Heller  and  Tait (1984).
28Moreover, higher wages in the region's emerging private scaor  (and in local offices of the
international  donor community)  are increasingly  draining  talent from the core civil services. In addition,
the civil service consists of too many engineers, and too few administrators, managers, economists,
accountants,  and auditors.
lbose  interviewed indicate that, rather than looking for ways to  streamline their core civil
services, the countries of Eastern Europe need to consider strategies to expand and improve them.  In
contrast, many government  services are provided by agencies  that are situated administratively  outside  of
the civil service, and these agencies may indeed need dramatic staff cuts.
Eastem Europe's secondary  schools, universities and institutes  have historically  offered almost
no education or training in economics and finance, public and private management, accounting and
auditing, project assessment, or tax administration."  About the only civil servants who are trained for
these functions are the few who received a  foreign education.  And while these critical skills and
knowledge appear to be virtually missing, governments  have been slow in determining their training
priorities and expressing  their needs to external donors.
A related problem is the strain placed on the limited  human resources  of domestic  bureaucracies
by the international  community  itself. TMis  comes  in two forms: excessive  and uncoordinated  international
contacts  distract governument  officials  from other matters of state; and the generous  salaries  of aid agencies
act to lure away some of the best domestic government staff.
The problem of missing skills is exacerbated by a tendency for low civil service salaries and
salary compression in all of Eastem Europe.' 2 As in the past,  managers supplement their pay by
teaching when they should be working in the ministries, while other civil servants moonlight or use
government time and resources for private business  sidelines.  With the expansion  of the private sector
in Poland, Czechoslovakia  and Hungary, better private sector remuneration  has induced a brain-drain  of
newly-trained  managers, financial technicians, and support staff.  TIbis  same pattern is now developing
elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  To the extent that the government cannot match salaries in the private
sector, even greater numbers of civil servants must be trained to compensate  for this brain-drain.
In addition, some of the debilitatingancien  regime culture of Eastern Europe's civil services  still
pervades many govermment  bodies.  Its implications  are a lack of tust  and a fear of communication,  a
"In addition, Eastern Europe's engineering  expertise tends to lag twenty  years behind  OECD
countries, and outside of Hungary there are not enough lawyers to draft reform legislation, nor civil
servants with necessary foreign language skills.
42For  example, the salary range in Romania's civi service appears to have a ratio of 1:3, only a
small fraction of the ratio found outside the region (e.g. in the Asian NIEs).
29staff that achieved  its positions  via a highly  politicized  system  of recruitment  and promotion,  and work
attitudes  and  tightly  directed  operational  methods  that are incompatible  with  a market  orientation.  One
part of the  trade-off  is well  lknow: nomenklatura  ofte have  better  training  for government  positions,  but
goverments question  their loyalties  and style  of operaion.
A final  staffing  problem  arise from the governent'  typical  method  of dealing  with the civil
servants  of obsolete  ministries:  in order  to avoid  layoffs  (or due to pernonel shortages),  redundant  staff
are placed  in instiudons  that  will  perform  new  conoomic  functions  - even  when  their skills  and  attitudes
are entirely mismatched. For instance, long-time  planning  office staff in Romania  were transferred  to the
privaization  office. And  in Poland  and  Romania,  former  pricesetters  are now  being  asked  to perform
as price  liberalization  watchdogs  in the now  anti-tu  offices;  even  though  both  jobs  involve  prices,  many
employees  may  be incapable  switching  to such  a diametrically  opposed  role. Those  interviewed  expressed
strong  opposition  to the practice  of politically-motivated  staff  shuffling  - particularly  to institutions  that
are critical  for the transition  - since  many skills  and work attitudes  are simply  not fungible  or would
necessitate  substantial  retraing  and reorientation.
One should  also keep in mind that, for the most part, there has been  too little time to judge
whether or not the these civil servants will rise to the challenge of implementing  the economic reforms.
In certain  countries  and agencies,  notably  most  ministries  of finance  and  the civil  services  of Hungary  and
Poland,  bureaucrats  once  operated  more-or-less  competently  given  the  former  system. In large  part,  mid-
level  govermnent  employees  have  no received  new  opeating directives  and  so continue  to operate  much
as before. Their  comptence  in decision-making  will  not  tuly be tested  until  the culture  and  rules  change.
As a first step, those  itiewed  would  have  goverments establish  personnel  administration
capacity,  introducing  a formal  civil  srvice with  a compewt, refom-oriented,  and  high-level  directorate.
Such  a governmuent-wide  personnel  office  would  be capable  of evaluating  its human  resource  needs  on a
systemic  basis.  During the taition,  this directorate  would  be charged  with civil service  reform:
determining  tainig  needs  and  orgaizingtrainigu  progams and  instituting  suctural changes  and  salary
reform. Later,  it would  become  the adminisarator  for the civil service.
Other measures  recommended  for immediate  goverment  action include  quickly identifying  the
greatest  needs  for salary  decompression,  and  then  implemefti  the most  critical  pay increases  needed  to
stem  the outflow  of personnel;$  the rapid  design  of short courses  for key skills  shortages,  in order to
'A  word  of warning:  the distributional  effect  of incrasd  salary  dispersion  is a delicate  social
issue, and  refrm  effrts must  pay atention  to its implications.
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help alleviate  bottlenecks;  and the establishment  of training  in  , since they take time to yield
results."
It has been  suggested  that  the multilaterl  instuons  finnce the preparation  of a comprehensive
medium-  and long-term  national  action  plan  for Easter European  civil service  development,  for which
the greatest expertise probably resides wih  managers and system  analyst  within the civil serice
directorates  of the Newly  Industrialized  Economies  and the OECD countries. Three broad types of
systemic  reform  to overhaul  the civil  sices  have  been  identified:  transforming  the bureaucratic  culture
and organizational  structure,  introducing  mechanisms  to assure  accountability,  and a major  expansion  of
training  capacity.
Although  the challenge  of changing  the commnist bureaucric  cultre  and ori  onal
structure is unprecedented,  governments  elsewhere  have dealt with analogous  transformations  in
rehabilitating  demoralized  civil services and in  moving  from authortarian to democraic political
structures. Eastern  Europe  can learn  from these  similar  experiences  and  can obtain  technical  assistance
from  those  involved.  Suggested  means  of transforming  the  bureaucracy  include:  a study  of the functional
stucture and priorities  of the govenment  bureaucracy;  a survey  of civil  servants'  attitudes  in order to
understand  the kind of changes  needed;  replacement  of the top few layers  of bureaucy;  development
of a professional,  merit-based  civil service  corps; video and seminar  presentations  aimed  at staff and
system  re-orientation;  new hirings  of (unindoctrinated)  recent  graduates;  and reorganizaton  to assure
improved  horizontal  and verical communication.
Efficient  government  depends  in part on the ability  to give  proper  signals  and incentives  to civil
servants  - a difficult  problem  with  which  govenment continue  to wrestle  even  in industrialzed  countries.
To this end, respondents  reconunend  that civil service reform include  mechanisms  to  ensure that
bureaucrats  be held accountable  for their actions.  A first step would  be to reassert  clear lines of
responsibility,  based  on the study  of the government's  functional  stucture. lTis would  enable  one  to trace
and evaluate  policy  implementation.
The introduction  of needed  incentives  could  then fo61ow  via a formalized  and transparent  civi
service  review  and promotion  system  - perhaps  including  merit testing  for advancement,  awards  for
meritorious  service, rewards for innovative  ideas that lead to efficiency  improvemens,  and financial
incentives  for state enterprise  managers. ITe civil service reform  would also contain methods  for
4  "Tis  is being  done  to a very limited  degree  for managers,  public  administrators,  accountantS,
bankers,  and economists  in various  parts  of the region.
31idendfying and punishing malfeasance  and non-feasance.  In this, Poland has taken the lead, using its
Inspecor Generd to audit government  opeations,  and its Attorney  General to prosecute fraud.
As suggested above, Eastem Europe faces an overwhelning need to train its civil servants."4
However, it appears  that leaders in goverment do not appreciate  the magnitude  of this need. Fortunately,
government employees  are hungry for training, and the opportunity  to enhance one's professional  skills
is seen as an enviable  job perquisite.  Moreover, local schools and institutes are now rushing to respond
to the new demand  for cetain occupational  skills.  Of particular note are new programs in business  and
public administration  in the CSFR, Hungary, Poland, and most recently in Romiania. Respondents  urge
governments  to expand  these efforts by initiating  teaching  seminars  by foreign instructors  in the areas of
economics and management  teaching, and teacher-training.
For the medium-term, donors could help quantify skills shortages and specific taining  needs
(i.e., their urgency, and the amount and level of training necessary), on a government-wide  basis (not
ministry-by-ministry). Such an effort would probably  use interviews  or tests of civil servants in several
ministries and agencies, and managers  in a range of state enterprises. Preferably, such tests would serve
two purposes: to diagnose  systemic needs and to root out untrainable employees.46
The governments  of Eastern Europe will have to rely in large part on existing  training facilities.
Yet foreign  experts appear to have little information  about the capacity  and capabilities  of these facilities.
Immediate  studies of domestic facilities  and their faculties  are essential, if they are to be used for training
and teaching in business, economics, public administration.
Foreign private and not-for-profit institutions  are already playing a part in expanding  training
capacity, and will certainly continue to do so.  These include traditional educational  institutions, as well
as less  conventional sources of  training  - like officials seconded from  government ministries in
'Mhe paper does not address the reforms of Eastern Europe's educational  systems. These systems
generally function on a par with other countries at their level of economic  development,  particularly at
the primary and secondary levels, and are primarily an area for medium-term  institutional  reform.
Untig  local expertise can develop, Eastern Europe will need to rely on imported foreign  teachers in key
subject areas at all educational  levels.  It appears  that, in general, such assistance  would be particularly
helpful at the level of training local teachers to give courses in business  and economics.
To some exte,  foreign educational  institutions  are already setting up operations  to teach
economics, business, accounting,  both independently  and in collaboration  with Eastern European
institutions. It seems that, in the absence of government  impediments,  these schools would be
prepared to expand their capacity.
'One  example is the current testing of East Germany's  judges.  If it is politically  impossible  to
select out civil servants based on a test, governments  may still wish to conduct anonymous  tests that
will serve only to diagnose  systemic needs.
32industrialized  and newly industrialized  economies,  foreign chambers  of commerce,  bar and other
professional  associations,  and labor  unions. Some  also  suggest  exploidng  the talents  of resident  coreign
accountants,  management  consultants,  lawyers,  etc. - perhaps  even  on a pro bono  basis. However,  it is
widely believed  that the scale of training activity by domestic and foreign-based  private institutions  will
be insufficient,  and that their lead times will be too great.
Technical assistance  and regional information-sharing  might assist Eastern European countries
in linking up with potential  external sources of training.  In addition, the World Bank and RAF are also
already directly involved in training, and there is a broad consensus  for stepping-up  this commitment.
Bilateral organizations have also begun limited programs of job  training and of  twinning" of civil
servants with their analogues in donor government  ministries.
The enormous  scale of the required training effort demands innovative  delivery methods. For
instance, Eastern Europe's civil servants are relatively computer  literate, and so some types of computer-
assisted courses might be economical. In addition, public broadcasters in the U.S. report that Western
European and  American public broadcasters are  already heavily involved in  planning educational
programming  for the region. They envision  several areas in whicb mss  media training can belp meet the
heavy training demand: television  and radio programming  can be used to educate civil servants (and the
population-at-large)  about the nature of a  market economy and of capitalist society; 4 'telecourses'
(including written materials) can be used for more technical training, in order to reach large groups of
civil servants nationwide, while economizing on scarce financing, classrooms and teachers; where a
professional  course or training is needed for smaller groups or at different times, delivery can be made
on-the-jobsite  by video tape or closed-circuit  television.
These few innovative  examples  iilustrate  how governments  might expand  their training capacity.
Multilateral and bilateral aid organizations  might evaluate the cost-effectiveness  of such methods, and
based thereon consider  financing the cost of course development
"Training via "twinning"  has the advantage  of immersing  the trainee in the foreign institutional
culture at the sme  time as he or she receives training.  In the U.S., for example, counterpart  civil
servants have been placed in the Department  of Justice, Environmental  Protection Agency, Federal
Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission,  as well as in municipal  governments. However, some of
those interviewed  expressed  reservations  about overseas training: that it is not cost-effective  and is
itself a vehicle for international  brain-drain. And although it has the administrative  advantage  of being
decentralized, it must be particularly well-structured  to have an impact.
"For example, Czechoslovak  radio broadcast  a series on entrepreneurship  last year.
33(I)  WY_MSI  M  i2  n  =ai
ne  overwhelming  public role in industrial investment  is quickly being abandoned  throughout
Eastern Europe.  Yet in most countries, foreign and domestic investors either are subject to micro- and
macro- economic  uncertainties, or they must wend their way through a cumbersome  approval process."
This may help explain Eastern Europe's disappointing  response from would-be  foreign direct investors,
and why the privatization  process is bogging down.
Governments  are quiciky learning the new role of investment  promotion and regulation. For
foreign investment,  Poland's reforms  have advanced  farthest: streamlining  of foreign investment  approvals
(based on a negative list of prohibited investnents), creation of the Agency for Foreign Investment to
promote and screen investment  and to guide investors through the bureaucracy and the economy, and
recent legislation  to lift important  remaining restrictions. Hungary is considering  establishing  a similar
investment  promotion agency, but with inter-ministerial  participation.  Another role for such agencies
might be to inform governments  of impediments  to investment,  and to lobby for their removal.
Athough  rules  on  private  domestic investment are  relatively liberal, observers call  for
government efforts to promote domestic  invesment as well.  In some respects, the need is greater, since
a lack of experience  renders local entrepreneurs  relatively unsophisticated. It may therefore be useful to
establish  a private or quasi-public  business  development  agency (see 'Assuring Fair Competition' below).
A few references also note one particular problem area that has received  very little attention: remaining
restrictions and arbitrariness in private access to real estate for commercial  use.
It is nearly impossible  for a government independently  to identify the impediments  confronted
by investors - only investors  can realistically  be expected  to do so.  Therefore, some of those interviewed
believe that governments  should commission  a survey  of business  attitude  should  be undertaken  to evaluate
existing investment  impediments  (and the usefulness  of existing  promotion efforts).
4ERomania  has not yet established its criteria for foreign investment. It seemns  that a small amount
of foreign investment  is taking place there even without ary transparent set of rules.
'Appendix 3 of Government  of Czech and Slovak Republics (1990) contains a list of some issue
areas that would be relevant in all Eastern European countries (and in most Western European
countries).
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Monopolies  are the natural order for a socialist economy, evidenced  most dramatically  in the
institutions  of central planning and pricing, and production in the region continues to be dominated  by
inefficient state monopolies.  In  response, governments have reentdy  enacted policies to  promote
commercial competition in  three  ways:  (1)  anti-trust activity and  regulation of  anti-competitive
practices," (2) lowering barriers to foreign import competition,' 2 and (3) breaking up state monopolies
into smaller enterprises.
Respondents endorse additional actions intended to ease market entry for business start-ups.
Across Eastern Europe, small businesses are disadvantaged  in comparison to large state enterprises in
terms of their access  to credit, inputs, and office and production  space; procurement  contracts;  and import
and export licenses. In an attempt to 'level the playing  field," governments  are looking  for ways to ease
market entry by small businesses. This will necessitate  a range of new activities  or new public agencies.
Poland has already taken several concrete steps in this direction: it incorporated financing
provisions for small firms in its financial and banking reforms, it is developing a data base for small
businesses, its new Anti-Monopoly  Office is working to thwart attempts  at predatory pricing by state
enterprises, and it has established  a new deparament  within  the Ministry of Industry to consider  the needs
of  small enterprises.  Elsewhere in  the region, Hungary included technical assistance and lending
components  for small business in a recent World Bank industrial restructuring  loan; Bulgaria has asked
5"Every  country of Eastern Europe has adopted  such legislation. In addition, the governments  of
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, and Poland have gone farther: each opened an "Anti-Monopoly  Office",
charged with enforcing new anti-trust laws and fighting  unfair competition;  and Poland has an active
program of bilateral technical  assistance in competition  policy, which are being emulated in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia. Howevef, many observers question  whether  these countries  are capable  of
implementing  anti-trust legislation.
"Lipton and Sachs (1990) argue that import liberalization  should suffice to introduce  lively
competition  into the small, open economies  of Eastern Europe. However, there are two criticisms  of
this liberal approach: first, foreign exchange shortages and forcign debt will restrict the ability of
Eastern Europeans  to buy foreign imports; and second, foreigners cannot compete  in non-tradable
goods and services.  The first point is indisputable,  although  its magnitude  cannot be estimated. As
for the second argument, one shoule"  maintain a healthy skepticism  about the true range of so-called
*non-tradables.0  Although some specific industries  may fall into this category, international
competition  elsewhere ha; entered many fields long considered won-tradables,  such as domestic
transportation, certain public utilities, and wholesale  and retail trade.  Since  one cannot  judge the
importance  of these two points, one should be cautious  about the near-term abilitY  of international
trade to eliminae monopoly  market power.
35for techical aMistance  in this  area as well;  and  Romania  inmds to give  priority  to the investment  needs
of its emerging  sector  of small,  privawe  fam.
One area that obsrves  feel needs immediate  atenion is in the reform  of existing  legal and
adminis  ve procedures for business entry and opersion.  lTese now clearly favor large, established,
monopolistic  enterprises  over new  entrepreneurs. The  governments  of the CSFR,  Hungary,  and  Poland
are already  acting  to reduce  these  barriers. One  respondent  suggested  that  officials  charged  with  writing
new  legislation  and  regulations  in this area  might  establish  channels  to receive  input  from nationwide  and
regionwide  associations  of small  busineaspeople.
For the mediua-term,  it i  necessary  to learn  more  about  the impediments  facing  small  and  start-
up enterprises,  and then to develop  an action  plan.  Research  is warnted  in the areas of (1) small
enterprise  promotion,  perhaps  to be modelled  after the private sector  development  agencies  in Korea,
Taiwan or Japan, all of which have impressive  track records; and (2) competition  policy, perhaps
supported  by the OECD's  competition  unit. An action  plan  might  include:  technical  assistance  and  other
support  from OECD  countries  through  their Chambers  of Commerce  (this  has already  begun),  national
agencies  for small  business  promotion,  and  trade and  professional  associations;  introducing  mechanisms
to identify  and countea  unfair  competition;  and establishing  a private  or quasi-public  support  agency
for small  business.
(3)  S  Q  C
The govnments  of Eastern Europe are obliged  to care for the losers in the process of
restructring, via welfare  payment to compensate  the poor for their income  loss, and benefits  and
retraining  for job losers.  Yet the region faces  dire limitations  on the resources  available  for social
programs. lhese governments  seem  aware  of the need  to design  programs  that  deliver  support  in a cost-
effective and easily implementable  manner, and which contain appropriate  incentives  to recipients.
As a matter of social philosophy,  unemployment  was deliberately  kept extremely  low in the
socialist  economies  of Easter Europe. Two  impications  of this legacy  are that (1) open  unemployment
is likely  to be particularly  difficult  and  distubing  for job losers,  and (2) these  countries  lack  institutional
structures  to deal  with  the needs  of large  numbers  of unemployed.  One  implicit  tradeff  of the  economic
-"Such  an agency  could  act as an informational  clearinghouse  for businesses,  help  new  enterprises
set up shop, provide  counseling  services,  and run practical  semias  on such  issues  as management,
accounting,  fince,  markeng, investment,  bidding  for government  contas,  and  exporting.
Respondens  reu that such  an agency  should  be decentralized  and  self-supporting  (via  user feet).
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reforms wIll therefore be the introduction  of unemployment  benefits  to compensate  for the elimination  of
guaranteed  employment.
Together, these considerations  point to the need for a rapid and concerted drive to develop
creative responses to the anticipated  large-scale unemployment. Short-term measures wIll necessarily
consist of ad hoc emergency  policies and procedures, while in the long-run  attention may turn to a more
comprehensive  delivery system.
The crushing burden of administering  unemployment-related  programs first manifested  itself in
Poland.  Although the country responded quickly by introducing appropriate norms and criteria for
benefits, its capacity  to finance and deliver these services  remains limited. Other countries  in the region
are learning some important  lessons  from Poland's pioneering experience:  that they cannot afford overly-
generous benefits (as currently are granted in Czechoslovakia  and Yugoslavia);  and that programs must
be tailored to a country's limited  capacity  to deliver services (unlike  Romania, which has a well-designed
system of benefits, but lacks much administrative  capacity). Given the region's fiscal constraints  and its
need for infrastructure,  benefits programs that require recipients  to work on public infrastructure  projects
may be of particular interest.5
In most of the region, the current fragile financial condition of state enterprises renders them
unreliable sources of financing for unemployment  benefits.  In the near-term, government budgets will
therefore have to shoulder  this burden, and financing  reforms will have  to wait until later in the transition.
Eventually, government unemployment  benefits systems should convert to insurance programs that are
self-financed  through employer contributions,  as will occur in Hungary this year.
Income support for unemploved workers is  rot  intended to  reduce unemployment.  The
liberalization  of labor markets  will go a long way toward opening  oppormtities  for the unemployed. Most
respondents also believe that more active programs will be required to help reintegrate the unemployed
into the workforce (see Vodopivec, I990).  Abundant  lessons were leaned  in Westem Europe from the
nagging unemployment  problems of the 1980s, suggesting that Eastern Europe can benefit from the
technical  assistance  of innovative  Western  European  labor ministries,  particularly  through advice  on short-
term mechanisms  to increase labor market flexibility  and help designing  a medium-term  plan.
Governments  can also enact a variety of immediate measures that would seek to spread the
burden of unemployment  more widely across the whole society.  Current experiments  of this sort. in
"The  1990 World Development  Report discusses  programs in which recipients  of social welfare
payments  are required to participate  in public works projects.  These are seen to have had success in
increasing incentives  to find alternative  employment,  decreasing incentives  to claim benefits, and
restoring neglected  physical infrastructure.
37CzehIo  klaOV  inude  oneoyear oxtesion of pediod for vocational  training, and elementary  and
university  educaion;  longer  vacaions  and more  holdays; limis on the employment  of pensioners;  and
the  itroduction  of  part-time employmet  (which was  vually  won-existen  under  socialist
governments).' Other  innovatiom  include  profit-sharing  bomus - which  uail  unemployment  in bad
times by allowing  wages  to fluctuate  - and fixed-tem employment  or a lower  training  wage  - which
makes  it less risky and expensive  to hire new  labor, and gives  new  job market  entrants  a better  chance
to be hired.
Respondents  foresee  a medium-tem  plan  dw would  set  forth a comprehensive  program  to train
and retrain  workers,  and align  public  education  systems  more  closely  with  the occupational  needs  of the
economy. It would  also address  two kinds  of constrain on labor mobility:  a lack of information  on
vacancies,  which might call for establishing  a job information  dearinghouse  (cither for government
employment  or all vacancies);"°  and price distrtions in the housing  sector thai impede  residential
tumover.  Such a plan might be expected  to evaluate  possible  assistance  to small businesses  for job
creation  and rainig.
"Governments  may  also choose  to limit  the generosity  of current  fringe  benefits,  such  as pension
coverage,  child care, sick an  maeity  leave,  and subsidies  for housing,  vacations,  and family
education.
1In the former  regime,  "Job  exchanges'  operated  as local  employment  offices,  with  economy-wide
vacancy  listings. I  some  cou  etries,  perhaps  pats of these  offices  are salvageable.
38CONCLUSION:  AN  AGENDA  FOR EMCERNAL  ATANCE
The interviews  and written  references  are unanimo  in at least  one  ob  on:  market  forces
alone  cannot  restore  Easte  European  capitalism.  For the  past  forty  years,  the markets  of Eastn  Europe
have been  systematically  sidestepped  and eliminated. Of coum,  market  forc  never  ceaed to exis,
manifesdtng  themselves  in the parallel  economy.  But  the exing  markets  are disrted  and rudimentary.
Therefore,  Eastern  European  governmen will require  dramatic  institonal  reform  in order to achieve
their ambitions  to become  market  ecoomies.
The government  of Easter Europe,  with  astonishing  speed,  have ntroduced  vast mnmben  of
legal changes  that are consistent  with democray and a maket eonomy.  In additon, they have
reorganized  some parts of the govenment  bureacy  and have plaus to do much more.  But it is
apparent  that structural  forms can be changed  on paper much faster ta  can actual functions  sud
capabilities  down  the line.
Some  observers  express  concers regarding  the  absence  of government  instuional development,
as well  as an apparent  lack  of a private  sector  development  response  to an impressve  array  of good,  new
legislation.  Yet not enough  time  has elapsed  to draw conclusions,  either  about  whether  the economy  is
responding  well  nor whether  any failure  to respond  results  from government' lack  of implementeaon
capacity.
It  appears that much of  Eastern Europe's reform press  must necessily  take place
independendy  of outside  organizations  and  assistance.  Reform  will  be an intny  political  prcess, with
inerest coalitions  emeging from time-consuming  public debate.  In all this, foreigners  can play a useful
role as advisors,  investors  and  creditors,  providing  a menu  of policy  options  and  innovations  to be debated
via interal poiitical  mechanisms.
- External  assistance  for government  initutional development  will  have  five components:  policy
advice,  technical  assistance,  training  of civil  servants,  diagwstic  reearch, and  medium-term  action  plans.
Across  the countries  of the region,  bowever,  priorities  will  vary  substanally  among  the specific  proposed
actions. For this reason,  measures  are listed  below  but  not prioritized.
(1)  Policy  Advice,  to encourage  governments  to pay auntion to the following  areas:
The inter-relatedness  of policy  measures,  and the need fbr simple  and transparent  laws  and
regulations  (pages  4 and 8).
39Exploiting  the  unused  potetial of extra-govermnental  sources  of advice  and  public  management
in the local  and expatriate  communities  (page  6).
Participating  more actively  (especially  for Bulgaria,  Romania,  and Yugoslavia)  in exchanging
views  and experience  among  Easter European  governments  (page  6).
Enhancing  perceptions  of goverment legidmacy  by expanding  participation  in policy-making
(page  9).
Expanding  twining arragements  between  public  and  private  institutions  in Easter Europe  and
their foreign  analogues  (page  21), including  parliaments  (page  7) and  subnational  governments
(page 15).
(2)  Technical  Assistance
Introducing  a  locus for macroeconomic  policy strategy and coordination  (page 4),  and
mechanisms  for coordinated  management  of foreign  assistance  and  debt,  and  technical  assistce
(page  12).
Expanding  capacity  to formulate  macroeconomic  projections  and  policy  strategies  (page  4).
Designing  a new  statistical  system  and  collecting  new  statistical  series  (page  6).
Introducing  measures  to strengthen  legislatures  (page  7).
Introducing  a program  to preempt  and  fight  corruption  (page  9).
Drafting  a comprehensive  economic  reform  program,  and  intoducing  public  information  efforts
to articulate  the program  to the public  (page  11).
Institutionalizing  channels  for the  government  to receive  and  respond  to citizens'  input  (page  14).
40Enactig  laws to define clearly  the jurisdictions  and  responsibilities  of each level of governmen
(page 15), and developing local revenue systems and cooperative  mechanisms  among  villages
(page 17).
Systems avalysis to economize  in the implementation  of new funcions (page 22).
Drafting  legislation,  and designing  mechanisms  for enforcement  and dispute  resolution  (page  23).
Redesigning  regulatory systems  (page 24).
Overhauling  tax administration  (page  25), and budgetng, public expenditure,  self-auditing  and
procurement  systems (page 26).
Establishing requirements for  independent financial auditing, disclosure and  reporting by
corporations (page  26) and subnational  govermnents  (age  27).
Prioritizing  public investnents (page  27).
Introducing  a formal civil service with a competent,  reform-oriented,  and high-level  directorate
(page 28).  Alleviating  the most critical cases of civil service salary compression  (page 28).
Establishing  systems  and criteria  for selecting  goverment managers  from among  former regimes
(pages 14 and 29).
Establishing  training institutes (page 32) and a job information  clearinghouse  (page 37).
Liberalizing  legal and administrative  procedures  for business  entry and operation, promoting  and
screening foreign investment, and designing a business development  agency for foreign and
domestic investors (page 34).
Design of unemployment  assistance  programs and programs to speed  job market re-entry (page
37).
41Introducing  measures  that enable the burden of unemployment  to be shared more widely acrs
the whole society (page 37).
(3)  Targeted  Training:
Of local govement  officials (page 16).
In tax policy-making  and administration  (page 25).
In public investment  project design, assessment, and management  (page 27).
In eonomics, finance, public and private management,  and accounting  and auditing (page  28).
Short courses for key skills shortages (page 29).
(4)  Diagnostic Researdcl
Nature and causes of the corruption problem (page  9).
Relationship  of labor unions to the reforms (page 10).
Relationships  between central and subnational  governments,  including their actual and desired
structures and capabilities  (page 16).
How much can be salvaged of the existing legal and regulatory systems; reform of the system
of legal education; and judicial development  (page 22).
The possibility  of devolving  Infrastructure  projects and functions  to the private sector (page  27).
Civil service salary compression  (page 28).
"Additionally, the World Bank is currently undertaking  a study of 'best practices' in Wester
European public adminisrion;  the results of this study can be incorporated  in a number of fields.
42Functional structure of the government bureaucracy  as a whole, and of individual  agencies,
induding their priorities and implementation  capacity (page 29).
Training needs and capacity  of the public and private sectors (pages  28 and 36), and innovative
methods of delivery (page 33).
Business  promotion, including (i) existing institutional  impedimets to investment  and efficient
commercial  operation (based on a national survey of private and state-owned  businesses); CHi)
small enterprise promotion; and (iii) compedtion  policy (page 34).
(5)  Design Medium-term  Action Plans, once the relevant issues  and capacities  are clarified:
Statistical development  (page 6)
Legal and structural changes in the relationships  between central and subnational  goverments
and for local government  training (page 15)
Legal and regulatory institutional reform (page 22)
Civil service development  (page 31).
Economy-wide  training (pages 32 and 38).
Business  promotion and competition  policy (page 34).
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